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Back in October 2022, when Rishi Sunak assumed office as the UK's leader, he was the fifth British prime minister to occupy the role in six years.

Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So how might we describe what is occurring in France, now on its sixth prime minister in 24 months – with three in the last ten months?

The current premier, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in return for opposition Socialist votes as the cost of his government’s survival.

But it is, at best, a short-term solution. The EU’s number two economic power is trapped in a ongoing governmental crisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for decades – perhaps not since the start of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no simple way out.

Governing Without a Majority

Essential context: ever since Macron initiated an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, the nation has had a divided assembly split into three warring blocs – the left, the far right and his own centrist coalition – none with anything close to a majority.

Simultaneously, the nation faces dual debt and deficit crises: its national debt level and deficit are now almost twice the EU limit, and strict legal timelines to pass a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are nigh.

In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who held the position from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.

In mid-September, the leader named his trusted associate Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which proved to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from allies and opponents alike.

To such an extent that the following day, he stepped down. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in modern French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “party loyalties” and “certain egos” would make his job all but impossible.

A further unexpected development: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for another 48 hours in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a task, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.

Next, two ex-prime ministers publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were early elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, engaging with all willing listeners. At the conclusion of his extension, he appeared on television to say he believed “a path still existed” to prevent a vote. The president’s office confirmed the president would name a fresh premier 48 hours later.

Macron honored his word – and on Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So recently – with Macron commenting from the wings that the country’s rival political parties were “creating discord” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Could he survive – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?

In a critical address, the 39-year-old PM spelled out his budget priorities, giving the centre-left Socialist party (PS), who detest Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s flagship reform would be suspended until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would refuse to support censorship votes proposed against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the government should survive those ballots, scheduled for Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS clearly stated that it would be seeking more concessions. “This move,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

Changing Political Culture

The issue is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, similar to the Socialists, the right-leaning parties are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – some are still itching to topple it.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.

To succeed, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in two years is, like his predecessors, toast.

Most expect this to occur soon. Even if, by some miracle, the divided parliament summons up the collective responsibility to pass a budget by year-end, the outlook afterward look bleak.

So is there a way out? Early elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: polls suggest nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would remain no decisive majority. A fresh premier would confront identical numerical challenges.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to resign. After winning the presidential election, his successor would dissolve parliament and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But that, too, is uncertain.

Surveys show the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that France’s voters, having elected a far-right president, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.

Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that decisive majorities are a bygone phenomenon, absolute victory is obsolete, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Many think that transformation will not be possible under the existing governmental framework. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The system wasn't built to encourage – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”